In recent years, the number of publications analyzing the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) with the game theory method has increased sharply. This paper reports on some current findings that show the usefulness, but also the limitation of game theory for the analysis of IEAs. It limits attention to the class of non-cooperative membership models and focuses on the relationship between different designs and the success of IEAs. The results are illustrated for the problem of climate change by the empirical model “Coalition Stability” (STACO) developed by Dellink et al. (2004). Subsequently, certain characteristics of the actual organization of contracts, which are not taken into account in this model, are discussed in reference to literature and their importance for future research. Theoretical research on the organization of international environmental agreements: knowledge, criticism and future challenges. / Finus, Mr. Enter your email address below and we will send you the reset instructions. .
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